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Abstract 
Drawing from relevant experiences in power systems around the world, this paper offers a 
critical review of existing policy support mechanisms for RES-E (renewable energy 
sources for electricity), with a detailed analysis of their regulatory implications. While 
recent studies provide an account of current RES-E support systems, in this paper we 
focus on the impacts these mechanisms have on the overall energy market structure and its 
performance in the short and long term. Given the rising importance of RES-E in systems 
everywhere, these impacts can no longer be overlooked. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, renewable energy sources for electricity (RES-E) have gained much 
importance in electric power systems around the world. These technologies are growing 
steadily to occupy a central role in electricity generation. Consider that in 2009, 60% of 
newly installed capacity in Europe came from RES-E. (REN21, 2010). Note that the 
European Commission’s Directive 2009/28/EC establishes “mandatory national targets 
consistent with a 20% share of energy from renewable sources and a 10 % share of energy 
from renewable sources in transport in Community energy consumption by 2020.” At 
national level in 2010, just to mention some of the most paradigmatic examples, in Denmark 
wind accounted for 20% of the gross electricity production (Danish Energy Agency, 2011), 
in Germany (BMU, 2011) RES-E's contribution to electricity supply was close to 17% (wind 
amounted for roughly a third of it), Spain relies on wind to supply over 15% of electricity 
(CNE, 2011) and in Texas wind energy represented 7.8% (ERCOT, 2011). 
RES-E’s crucial role, particularly in EU’s electricity sector, is expected to be even more 
important in the near future: for 2020, the Danish Government (2011) announced that more 
than 60% of electricity production will have renewable origin, while the target of the 
German Government (BMU, 2011) is a 35% share of RES-E in total gross electricity 
consumption and the Spanish government expects RES-E to contribute 42% of total 
electricity demand (MITyC & IDAE, 2010). 
Yet, the still comparatively higher cost of RES-E technologies has made it virtually 
impossible for them to grow without regulatory intervention. There is still considerable 
uncertainty among governments and regulatory agencies about the kind of policy 
framework needed to manage the incorporation of these technologies into the larger 
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generation mix of a country or region. Support mechanisms for RES-E are colliding with 
existing economic and industrial policies much more frequently; this clash often reflects 
political sensitivity to voters’ perceptions and stakeholders’ interests. More tangible 
concerns include the potential for RES-E to displace older and more polluting technologies, 
the impact costlier RES-E can have on energy prices, and the effects that the stochastic 
nature of renewable fuels has on the delivery of electricity. Thus, while in this last decade 
the RES-E technology learning has been very important, the regulatory learning has not 
been so pronounced, and a large number of crucial regulatory questions are still waiting for 
a proper response.1 
Prominent among these unsolved issues is how best to design subsidy regimes to ensure the 
proper development of RES-E. Currently, there are two different types of support methods: 
• Indirect methods, i.e. implicit payments or discounts as well as institutional support tools 
that include: research and development funding, below-cost provision of infrastructure or 
services (costs of technical adaptations such as shadow connection charging (Auer et al., 
2009) or costs of imbalances and ancillary services in general),2 and positive discriminatory 
rules (such as regulations facilitating grid access for RES-E power, RES-E dispatch 
priority in the EU and other: net metering, building codes, etc.). 
• Direct methods— these methods refer to investment supports, such as capital grants, tax 
exemptions or reductions on the purchase of goods and operating support mechanisms, i.e. 
price subsidies, obligations, tenders and tax exemptions on production (Commission of the 
European Communities, 2008). 
Drawing from relevant experiences in power systems around the world, this paper offers a 
critical overview of existing policy supports for RES-E, with a focus on direct methods. We 
provide a detailed review of the different schemes and design features implemented to date, 
keeping an analytical distinction between the two categories for direct methods: price-based 
supports, which fix the price to be paid for renewable electricity, and quantity-based 
supports, which determine a specific amount of electricity to be produced by RES-E. While 
recent studies provide an account of current RES-E support systems, in this paper we focus 
on the impacts that these mechanisms have on the overall energy market structure and its 
performance in the short- and long-term. Given the rising importance of RES-E in systems 
everywhere, these impacts can no longer be overlooked. 
                                                 
1 See Pérez-Arriaga (2011) for a discussion of how power systems can properly manage large scale penetration 
of intermittent renewables and also some of the regulatory implications. 
2 For instance, in Italy, RES-E receive remunerations at the spot market price, but, in contrast to Spain’s wind 
markets, Italian generating units are exempt from paying the cost of their imbalances in the short term. 
Incidentally, this provides them with a negative incentive to underestimate the expected production to be 
declared in the day-ahead market, since this bias increases the spot market price thus ensuring a higher 
remuneration. RES-E generating units need not worry themselves with penalties or the correction of 
imbalances that must take place in the secondary markets. Similar issues have been observed in Spain in the 
case of reactive control services (Imaz, 2007). 
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2 RES-E DIRECT REGULATORY SUPPORT SCHEMES 
2.1 Price-Based Mechanisms 
2.1.1 Feed-in-Tariffs 
The basic feature of feed-in tariffs (FIT) is to guarantee RES-E generators a specific price 
per MWh that is produced. To encourage development of new RES-E capacity, FIT must be 
high enough to ensure long-term recovery of costs for a given technology. In most power 
systems, FIT at least apply during 10 years; in some cases, support is guaranteed for as 
many as 30 years. According to the most recent REN21 Global Status Report, by 2010 at 
least 50 countries and 25 states and provinces had instituted FIT supports for RES-E 
generators. 
FIT have been in place for a good number of years now. As a result, FIT have progressively 
incorporated a variety of rules into the basic, original design, namely: 
• Regulatory agreements or contracts: in some cases the FIT just takes the form of a 
regulatory commitment that is embedded in some law or specific decree (as is the case in 
Spain). In other cases, such as Germany, the FIT mechanism takes the form of a contract 
that has the System Operator as counter-party (Lipp, 2007).  
• Flat or stepped tariffs3: The cost of RES-E development can vary greatly depending on the 
choice of technology (wind vs. solar vs. biomass) and other characteristics such as siting or 
scale (e.g. onshore vs. offshore wind). For this reason, some governments offer so-called 
“stepped” tariffs—differentiated levels of remuneration according to the RES-E profile.4 
Tariff levels can be defined according to (mainly) technology, location or plant size. As 
stated in Brown et al. (2009), the chief aim of stepped tariffs is to try to minimize the “risk 
of overcompensating plants with efficient technologies or scale (excessive rents) and to 
reduce the cost of support or burden for consumers.” While it may appear sensible to 
distinguish among technologies such as wind or solar PV (a single tariff for all of them 
would lead to exploiting just the most cost-efficient technology in the short term)5, 
applying stepped tariffs within a single technology is not necessarily good. Aside from the 
fact that differentiation significantly complicates the tariff-setting process, stepped 
mechanisms also minimize the potential for tariffs to send an efficiency signal to market 
players, since these tariffs mitigate the incentive to invest in the most efficient alternatives 
first. 
• Constant or decreasing payment stream: FIT can follow either a constant or a decreasing 
payment structure through the contract period. In Germany, FIT for solar PVs maintain 
the same level of remuneration with contracts that usually last 20 years. In contrast, an 
alternative model is to design a larger payment in the first years of operation and reduce it 
progressively afterwards. This solution helps to reduce the need for substantial project 
                                                 
3 See Klein et al. (2008) for a detailed analysis. 
4 For instance, in Germany, FIT for rooftop solar PV vary depending on the size—up to 30 MW; between 
30 kW and 100 kW; above 100 kW; and above 1,000 kW. 
5 It is important to note that the objective of RES-E support mechanisms is not to encourage the deployment of 
a single technology (e.g. the cheapest) in the short-term, but rather to improve the learning curve of a variety 
of RES-E types. This is because it is never clear which of RES-E type will become the most efficient in the long 
run. 
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finance. Sometimes, the reduction is proportional to the plant’s performance in this first 
period, again with the goal of mitigating “excessive” rents. 
• Tariff degression: in this approach remuneration for RES-E generators is scheduled to 
decrease overtime either at a pre-determined rate or according to the capacity that gets 
installed. There is considerable difficulty in correctly identifying the starting point for 
degression and the degression rate, especially if RES-E projects experience delays and 
changes in their long-term expenditures. Some countries, like Germany, set annual 
degression rates; percentage decreases are also technology-specific. Spain’s degression 
rates are determined by the National Energy Commission (CNE) and applied not annually 
but every three months.6 Degression is implemented as a way to counter RES-E energy 
surplus and is a reasonable way of preventing disproportionate deployment of a particular 
RES-E technology. As far as the general public opinion goes, disproportionate deployment 
fuels many of the political arguments against renewables—that it is too expensive, that 
supports are too generous, that RES-E places too much of a tariff burden on final 
consumers, etc.7 On the other hand, degression can nonetheless pose a significant 
regulatory risk for investors: if the degression rates change during the project 
development process, investors may not be able to meet their originally expected return 
requirements.  
Some countries have begun to attach additional requirements to existing FIT regimes. For 
example, in Denmark, remuneration for renewable power is offered only if RES-E owners 
provide financial participation to property owners in the lands surrounding the plant site.  
2.1.2 Feed-in Premiums 
Feed-in-premiums (FIP) are payments guaranteed to RES-E generators on top of existing 
electricity market prices; thus, FIP operate much like a kind of ‘renewable’ capacity payment. 
Similar to FIT, these premiums are valid for a specific contract period. In Spain, as proposed 
in Pérez-Arriaga et al. (2005) and afterwards mandated by the Royal Decree 661/2007, 
premiums are offered only within a specific range, i.e. they have a floor and some sort of a 
cap.8 In the case of Finland, the new subsidy scheme established in January 2011 consists of 
a FIP payable for 12 years, according to which wind installations receive the NordPool 
market price plus the difference between a target price (83.5 EUR/MWh, 105.3 €/MWh if 
the installation enters in operation before the end of 2015) and the average of the spot 
market price in the last 3 months (Holttinen, 2011). 
2.1.3 Fiscal Incentives and Other Price-Based Mechanisms 
Tax Incentives 
A variety of fiscal incentives usually complement RES-E support mechanisms. In the United 
States, this type of incentive is best exemplified by the Modified Accelerated Cost Recovery 
System (MACRS). Under MACRS, the U.S. government offers an accelerated depreciation 
                                                 
6 Photovoltaic energy tariff for ground-based plants has been reduced every three months since 2008, 
decreasing by 60% between 2008 and the second quarter in 2011. 
7 This problem would not be as significant if the investors involved in RES-E were publicly owned entities. 
This is the case in Denmark, where 75% of RES-E market participants have some form of public participation. 
8 In the case of wind, the remuneration cannot fall below 73 EUR/MWh (which includes both the market price 
plus the premium); the premium is set to zero when the market price is above 87 EUR/MWh.  
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schedule over a 5-year period to most RES-E technologies: solar PV and solar thermal, fuel 
cells and micro turbines, geothermal electric, direct use geothermal and geothermal heat 
pumps, small wind, and combined heat and power. Some biomass facilities are eligible for 7-
year depreciation schedules, see “Energy Property” clause in IRS (2011). Other tax-based 
incentives include tax exemptions offered to RES-E generators on the basis of installed 
capacity as well as total renewable energy production. For instance, in Finland, the tax on 
fuels is determined on the basis of their carbon content (Ministry of Employment and the 
Economy, 2011). 
In China, the central government introduced the “Implementing Regulations for Enterprise 
Income Tax Law” in January of 2008. The law provides a 3-year tax exemption for 
enterprises developing projects focused on renewable energies and energy conservation 
technologies. Following the exemption period, these companies are also eligible for a 
subsequent 3-year period in which their income taxes are set at only 50% of the regular level 
(Ma, 2011). 
Tax credits are a popular form of support in countries such as the United States 
(Schmalensee, 2009) and Brazil (Batlle & Barroso, 2011). The U.S. Federal Production Tax 
Credit program (PTC), originally created under the 1992 Energy Policy Act and renewed 
under the 2009 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA), offers credits to RES-E 
generators over a 10-year period on a per-kWh basis (e.g. US$21/MWh for wind until the 
end of 2012). Eligible technologies include landfill gas, wind, biomass, hydroelectric, 
geothermal, solid waste, small hydroelectric, among others; solar technologies are excluded.  
Aside from PTC, ARRA offered an additional support: Investment Tax Credits (ITC) that 
alleviate some of the development costs associated with new RES-E generation by reducing 
the regulatory risk linked to PTC. Since the tax credits apply to profits, they can be 
significantly less valuable for those developers who are not especially profitable, since, for 
these developers, taxes on income are comparatively low. For this reason, the U.S. 
Department of the Treasury offers cash grants to new RES-E developers. Both ITCs and 
cash grants apply to up to 30% of total costs.  
Investment Incentives 
There are other types of cash supports for RES-E developers. For example, investment 
subsidies offer upfront payments whose amount depends on the total installed capacity. In 
the U.S., all states except Arkansas provide some form of investment subsidy for RES-E 
(Schmalensee, 2009). Additionally, soft loans are offered across a variety of administrative 
scales; governments such as Costa Rica have soft loan programs, while, on the other hand, 
the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) has committed over US$1 billion in loans for 
renewable energy development in the Americas, including over US$900 million for 
hydropower and US$9 million in technical assistance grants (REN21, 2010). These loan 
programs usually have attractive features such as below-market interest rates and long 
repayment periods. Finally, some countries enact import duty restrictions in support of local 
RES-E developers. 
2.2 Quantity-Based Mechanisms 
2.2.1 Renewable Portfolio Standards 
Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPS), also referred to as tradable green certificates (TGCs) 
or renewable obligations (ROs) in the EU, establish quota requirements for consumers, 
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suppliers, and/or generators to ensure that a portion of their electricity comes from RES-E. 
Tradable certificates are awarded for every unit produced from RES-E; these certificates are 
then bought by those required to comply with the RES-E quota.9 
Several options exist in the design and implementation of RPS: 
• Non-compliance penalties: to enforce observance of RPS, countries such as Sweden have 
set buy-out penalties equivalent to 150% of the RES-E certificate price, the revenues of 
which are passed on to RES-E generators. In Chile, a fine of US$28/MWh applies if the 
requirement is not met; if there is a repeated lack of compliance over a three year period, 
the fine rises gradually up to US$42/MWh. 
• Banding provisions: as implemented in the United Kingdom, RPS requirements are set up 
differently depending on the source RES-E technology; see Department of Energy and 
Climate Change (2011). The objective is to ensure an overall push for RES-E by providing 
higher levels of support for higher cost technologies (“banding up”) and to gradually 
decrease support for lower cost technologies (“banding down”). Support usually comes in 
the form of tradable certificates. For example, geothermal will receive more certificates per 
MWh than wind; offshore wind will receive more certificates per MWh than onshore 
wind.  
• Long-term contracting obligations: localities such as California, which has one of the most 
aggressive RPS schemes in the U.S., have attached long-term contractual obligations to 
these standards. The state requires stakeholders to source renewable energy from certified 
units for periods as long as 20 years. 
• Minimum prices: RPS regimes can often add an additional support for RES-E through the 
establishment of minimum prices for renewable certificates, thus guaranteeing revenue 
safeguards to RES-E producers.  
While not as prevalent as price-based mechanisms, RPS are nonetheless currently in place in 
at least 10 countries and 46 states and provinces. In the U.S., RPS have only been 
implemented at the state level; 29 have mandatory regimes and an additional 7 have set non-
binding requirements.10 At the federal level, there have been more than 25 unsuccessful 
attempts to establish a comprehensive RPS regime over the last decade (Till, 2011). In early 
2011, President Barack Obama’s administration announced the goal of doubling the share of 
clean electricity within the next 25 years. According to the Obama administration, “clean 
energy” currently accounts for 40% of total electricity. This assertion requires some 
qualification. According to the 2010 Clean Energy Act, the term “clean energy” refers to a 
wide variety of options, including solar, wind, geothermal, ocean energy, qualified waste-to-
energy, qualified nuclear (if the unit was incorporated on or after the 2010 Act), advanced 
coal generation, eligible retired fossil fuel generation, as well as any other clean energy 
                                                 
9 In some cases, the tradability of the obligations varies: in the US, for instance, the state of Colorado allows 
buying certificates all across the United States, while Texas allows in-state trading only.  
10 In the U.S., RPS are considered to be a crucial mechanism to more efficiently and quickly deploy RES-E. Yet, 
it is worth noting that in Texas, often referred to as the paradigmatic example of success in the U.S., RPS 
appear not to have been the key factor. Overall RPS targets for the year 2025 (10,000MW) were met in 2010 
by wind facilities alone—15 years head of schedule. As pointed out by the Texas State Energy Conservation 
Office (2011), there have been other explaining factors, such as competitive pricing, federal tax incentives, and 
the state's immense wind resources. 
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source based on innovative technology “as determined by the Secretary” (U.S. Congress, 
2010). 
Additionally, there are proposals that seek to implement tradable “clean energy certificates” 
that could be awarded to generating units according to their efficiency and level of 
greenhouse gas emissions level. For example, combined cycle gas turbines would be less 
clean than wind or nuclear generation and receive fewer certificates. If the criteria used to 
define “clean energy” generation and to allocate the tradable certificates are based on carbon 
emission rates, then this approach yields similar results to CO2 emissions allowance-trading 
schemes. 
2.2.2 Competitive auctions 
Through auctions (tenders), governments and regulators set the amount of renewable 
capacity to be built during a specific period and carry out a bidding process in order to find 
the least-costly, most attractive offer from RES-E generators.11 The winner of the bid is 
usually offered a long-term contract for the production of renewable electricity, thus 
reducing the uncertainty for RES-E developers while simultaneously helping regulators 
meet their own capacity growth objectives. 
As it can be read in NYSERDA (2011), ‘New York’s RPS program uses a central 
procurement model, with NYSERDA as the central procurement administrator. (...) 
NYSERDA pays a production incentive to renewable electricity generators selected through 
competitive solicitations for the electricity they deliver for end use in New York. In 
exchange for receiving the production incentive, the renewable generator transfers to 
NYSERDA all rights and/or claims to the RPS attributes associated with each MWh of 
renewable electricity generated.’ 
Auctions can be size- or technology-driven,12 as it is the case of Brazil,13 and also can be 
combined with other mechanisms. In Uruguay, winning bidders must incorporate locally 
manufactured content into the RES-E project.14  
3 ANALYSIS OF RES-E SUPPORT MECHANISMS: PROS AND CONS 
Below we provide an analysis of direct support mechanisms. We keep a special focus on the 
impacts that each regulatory design has on the overall energy market structure and the 
potential benefits and barriers that may result in each case. 
                                                 
11 Auctions are always categorized as quantity-based mechanisms, given that bidding processes begin only 
after regulators have set a specific capacity goal. However, in many cases, energy authorities determine a 
quantity-price curve that applies to the RES-E technology, keeping the ability to acquire more or less quantity, 
depending on the bids received. 
12 The state of California has set up the Renewable Auction Mechanism (RAM), a mechanism for renewable 
distributed generation (DG) projects up to 20 MW on the system side of the meter, see California Public 
Utilities Commission (2010). 
13 In the Brazilian case, RES-E technologies are entering the system through competitive long-term auctions, 
which have taken many different forms (Batlle & Barroso, 2011). Brazil has implemented auction rules that are 
meant to favor specific technologies, such as biomass; their bids are multiplied by a factor smaller than 1, thus 
reducing their costs and making these RES-E more competitive (Batlle & Rodilla, 2010). Peru has implemented 
a similar solution. In recent long-term auctions, bids from hydro plants were de-rated to make them more 
competitive.  
14 This is also the case of the FIT implemented in Ontario. 
Working Paper CEEPR 
8  
3.1 Price-based Mechanisms 
3.1.1 FIT.  
Pros 
Guaranteed remuneration from FIT provides long-term certainty for RES-E developers, 
who are thus no longer exposed to risks associated with electricity market prices.15 In 
addition, unlike price-based mechanisms such as RPS, FIT do not expose RES-E developers 
to risk in the certificates market, since there is no competition among RES-E providers (see 
RPS section below for a discussion of this type of risk).  
FIT provide the appropriate kind of support for RES-E technologies that have moved 
beyond the R&D phase but that have not reached market maturity and a strong presence in 
the system. In other words, FIT can go a long way to foster the commercial viability of 
RES-E technologies. Conversely, technologies such as solar PV have access to FIT in 
numerous countries around the world. This has resulted in conditions of over-support and 
overpayment for PVs, to the extent that the technological improvements can hardly keep up 
with the regulatory enthusiasm for this RES-E. The designers of a RES-E support 
mechanism should have clear from the outset whether they want to promote a massive 
deployment of one or more renewable technologies, to encourage technological innovation 
or both, as well as the temporal horizon to reach any targets.  
FIT place a low administrative burden on regulators and basically have no associated 
regulatory barriers to RES-E generators who wish to benefit. For instance, FIT reduce 
barriers to entry since investors do not need to find any electricity buyers (e.g. a retailer or 
another generator). 
Importantly, since RES-E generating units under FIT receive a remuneration that does not 
depend on wholesale market prices, these plants do not contribute infra-marginal capacity 
for incumbent generators that operate both traditional generation assets in the energy 
market as well as RES-E, thus reducing their market power. Consequently, FIT do not 
create a competitive advantage for incumbent generators and thus level off the playing field 
across both conventional as well as new RES-E generators. 
Cons 
The most evident disadvantage of FIT is that is extremely challenging to determine the 
right remuneration levels for RES-E. Specifically, there is information asymmetry between 
the regulator in charge of setting the FIT and the producers who will benefit—it is virtually 
impossible for the former to correctly assess the costs of the latter. There is a distinct risk 
that FIT will either fall short and fail to produce enough economic incentives for new RES-
E developers to enter the electricity market, or that FIT will be too high and result in 
overinvestment at very high cost, without necessarily resulting in a proportional 
                                                 
15 This is not to say that RES-E do not face other risks, which, to provide simple examples, can range from 
unfavorable wind patterns (particularly when there are no sufficient historical records available) to operational 
risks, as for instance extreme weather conditions that can damage the turbines. 
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technological improvement. This is of special concern in RES-E technologies that have 
relatively similar deployment costs for all developers.16 
A guaranteed revenue stream purely linked to production reduces the incentive for RES-E 
generators to appropriately react to market price signals by adjusting their production 
accordingly, as well as reducing any system imbalances between demand and supply. While 
the response to imbalances applies to all technologies (as shown in the FIP discussion 
below), only certain RES-E can be considered truly dispatchable, namely biomass and small 
hydro with reservoir storage, and thus can somehow manage and operate according to 
energy price signals. However, FIT can incorporate incentives for all RES-E technologies to 
contribute in reducing imbalances, at least by improving the forecast of their outputs. 
Finally, contrary to what it is often assumed, one must not ignore the fact that FIT are 
subject to the customary regulatory risks, since they are just a regulatory instrument that is 
backed-up by a regulatory commitment. FIT are embodied in special decrees or in electricity 
acts and require the government to allocate the incurred additional costs to electricity 
consumers or to taxpayers. Yet, as governments and political preferences change, so the 
regulations that govern FIT might also change (although they should not do so 
retroactively). In the Czech Republic, FIT were recently reduced retroactively after the 
government determined that RES-E were enjoying unusually high benefits, and (sadly) a 
similar situation has taken place in the Spanish case for the case of solar PV installations, 
where recently retroactive measures have been implemented reducing the remuneration that 
was committed in previous regulations. Moreover, there may be a number of financial 
reasons why a government or a system operator decides to stop paying for RES-E, as has 
been the case in some Latin American countries during times of fiscal difficulty. In contrast, 
a power contract offers more protection since it affords legal recourse to an aggrieved party.   
3.1.2 FIP 
Pros 
Unlike FIT, premiums do not suppress incentives for RES-E generators to adjust their 
production according to price signals. It is worth noting that this is true for RES-E 
technologies that are ‘dispatchable,’ i.e. sources that can increase production in response to 
high prices: biomass plants can burn more feedstock according to price signals, while 
windmills are not able to do this. However, wind producers as well as other less dispatchable 
RES-E generators can still find incentives to more properly manage operations and 
maintenance as well as forecasting, e.g. wind generators will find it wise to ensure they can 
produce during the most profitable hours.17  
                                                 
16 In other words and to provide a simple example, if it is relatively easy for anyone to purchase and install 
solar panels for rooftops or solar farms, unnecessarily high FIT will incentivize virtually everyone to pursue 
this technology, resulting in over-deployment without having to make any special effort in innovation to 
reduce costs.  
17 For instance, one of the clear positive consequences of the implementation of FIP in Spain is that currently 
90% of the wind installations can be remotely monitored and controlled. The operator of each balancing region 
has real-time knowledge of the status of each plant with respect to operating conditions, output, and 
availability. The operator is also able to communicate timely instructions to the plants, regarding frequency 
control, voltage control, or curtailment orders. 
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Cons 
Premiums are granted on top of the market prices and thus experience higher risks. As 
mentioned, at worst, FIP can create an incentive for generators not just to avoid predicting 
generation but even to engage in gaming via the prediction, which could lead to inefficient 
electricity dispatch and therefore to potentially higher prices and higher premiums.  
The market risks associated with FIP result in more barriers to entry for new RES-E 
developers and give a competitive advantage to vertically integrated companies (e.g. 
generation and retail). Therefore, FIP create an incentive for integration of different 
technologies, which is not necessarily a negative outcome but can nonetheless create market 
power problems. Conventional generators may expand their portfolio by investing in RES-E 
technologies and thus gain market power by maintaining infra-marginal capacity, as 
mentioned in the discussion of FIT. While this may not be of concern in systems where 
RES-E do not yet occupy a prominent role, it does have an impact in countries such as 
Spain, where, as mentioned above, wind already provides 15% of total electricity. Indeed, in 
the Spanish case FIP replaced FIT in 2004. Before this year, many new small independent 
investors were responsible for a very significant amount of wind installations. Notably, after 
the change, it is the incumbent generators who own most new installations. 
3.1.3 Fiscal and Other Incentives 
Pros 
Fiscal options have the clear advantage of reducing the cost of financing for the RES-E 
developers, mainly through flexible or accelerated depreciation over a specific time period. 
Moreover, mechanisms such as tax credits do not place a direct burden on electricity 
consumers through increased tariffs. Instead, fiscal incentives become part of the 
government’s or the relevant governmental agency’s budget. Needless to say, this 
characteristic raises other political questions, which will be discussed in the conclusion. 
Cons 
The most salient problem with fiscal incentives is that they are beneficial only from an 
equity perspective. In other words, tax credits and other incentives are most useful to RES-
E developers who have a large revenue stream and can turn these mechanisms into cash for 
their own operations. Some RES-E generators may choose to enter into ad-hoc, tax-oriented 
partnerships and joint ventures with companies with higher profits who would find the fiscal 
incentives more beneficial. 
Also, if the ultimate goal is to encourage the production of renewable electricity, regulators 
should keep in mind that investment incentives facilitate investment but may no necessarily 
yield higher levels of production.  
Finally, as is the case with FIT, which can change according to government priorities, fiscal 
incentives that are part of the state’s budget items are especially vulnerable to regulatory 
risks and adjustments. 
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3.2 Quantity-based Mechanisms 
3.2.1 Renewable Portfolio Standards 
Pros 
Ideally, if properly deployed, RPS and similar quota-based mechanisms are the most 
economically efficient support for RES-E. Determining the target percentage for renewable 
sources allows for market competition between RES-E developers and for a better 
determination of energy prices. Moreover, certificate trading encourages overall efficiency 
and gives generators some flexibility in other to meet government targets. Trading can take 
place across different geographies and systems, thus increasing the trans-national and trans-
state efficiencies. 
Also, as MIT Professor Richard Schmalensee suggested in one of his lectures, one practical 
advantage of RPS mechanisms (this is true of fiscal incentives as well) is that the cost of 
supports are “less visible”, since they are embedded in final energy prices, unlike FIT, which 
have more explicitly defined support levels. 
Cons 
As inferred in the FIT section above, RES-E providers are subject to two different types of 
market risk. The first is associated with fluctuations in electricity prices in the wholesale 
market; RES-E and other generators are all vulnerable to this risk. The second risk comes 
from trading; for example, with tradable RPS certificates, it is possible that overinvestment 
in RES-E would lead to low prices for certificates, thus further exposing participants in the 
market. FIT avoid this altogether. 
This second risk, which is linked to the price volatility of RECs, can be significantly reduced 
if stakeholders are not just subject to a quota requirement, but also compelled to fulfill their 
commitment by entering into long-term contracts with renewable developers, as it is the 
case of California, as previously mentioned, and also other US states with RPS regulations. 
In those systems in which the retail market has not been fully deregulated or the unbundling 
levels are weak, a crucial factor for the success of this approach is the mechanism to provide 
the regulator with sufficient warranties that these purchases are made in a transparent and 
competitive way, so load serving entities are allowed to pass-through the cost of the contract 
to consumers. In this context, as it is the case of New York State, centralized auctions 
appear as the natural solution to avoid complicated monitoring processes on a case by case 
basis. 
In contrast to mechanisms like stepped tariffs, RPS usually do not differentiate across 
technologies. As a result, generators and other stakeholders will likely prefer the most cost-
efficient technologies in a specific market to meet RPS targets. To fix this shortcoming, as 
already outlined, the UK and other countries have implemented banding provisions, which 
provide differentiated levels of trading certificates in support of each one of the technologies 
(for example awarding solar developers with double amount of certificates than wind ones). 
Another alternative is to explicitly define different quotas for different RES-E technologies, 
forcing for instance a minimum quota of wind and another of solar. The risk with this 
approach is that it reduces competition within each band and reduces the liquidity of RES-E 
markets. 
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Similar to FIP, RPS create incentives for conventional generators to integrate RES-E into 
their overall portfolios and achieve vertical integration. Again, this tendency can create 
barriers to entry for new RES-E participants and may result in increased market power for 
large players; for example, retailers required to abide by RPS will prefer to source renewable 
electricity from their own affiliates than to purchase power from new RES-E generators.  
For example, in Chile, where the market for RES-E is still very recent, conventional 
generators are required to purchase renewable electricity to meet RPS. The Chilean 
regulation imposes penalties to enforce compliance when generators fail to meet RES-E 
targets, the revenue from which is passed on to installed RES-E generating units. Recent 
experiences in Chile suggest that generators are far from meeting RPS targets. 
Conventional generators themselves own the few installations already in place (they are not 
buying renewable power from generating units not affiliated to them). These conventional 
generators have no problem paying penalties for non-compliance, since the associated costs 
are unavoidably passed on to consumers and their own RES-E stand to benefit since they are 
the ultimate recipients of these penalties. Thus, RPS penalties can become de facto feed-in-
tariffs. 
3.2.2 Auctions 
Pros 
Auctions share many of the advantages from FIT mechanisms: reduced risk for RES-E 
generators as a result of guaranteed remuneration, comparatively low administrative and 
transaction costs (although larger than FIT’s) and a reduction of barriers to entry. However, 
auctions have a distinct advantage over FIT: they relieve the regulator from the task of 
having to identify the costs associated with RES-E and instead it is the market participants 
who have to ‘reveal’ the appropriate support levels through bidding. In addition, the 
contracts that usually come with a winning bid reduce long-term risk for RES-E generators.  
Auctions effectively centralize the process for RES-E development in the overall system and 
can thus facilitate economics of scale. In contrast to RPS, where participants such as small 
retailers must observe and meet specific targets on an individual basis, auctions offer an 
opportunity for market players to create partnerships and succeed in building more cost-
effective and efficient RES-E projects. 
Cons 
Auctions are most effective if the RES-E industry is mature enough to profit from the 
bidding process and the benefits given to the winning bidder. As the experience in the 
United Kingdom (UK) has shown, auctions offered at an immature stage can yield no results. 
In the nineties, as part of the country’s overall move toward deregulation, the UK drafted a 
number of orders, known collectively as the Non-Fossil Fuel Obligation (NFFO), to support 
the delivery of renewable electricity in the system. Consequently, the country carried out a 
series of auctions for RES-E which were met with great enthusiasm. However, winning 
bidders underestimated the development costs for what were then still-immature 
technologies and failed to deliver on their projects. A similar situation took place in China. 
In 2003 the government organized the first call for national wind farm concession tenders. 
As described in Ma (2011), some developers, especially state-owned enterprises, committed 
to unreasonably low prices. Since these bids were used to form the benchmark price for on-
grid wind tariffs, many companies could not recover their costs. In successive rounds of 
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tenders, bids incorporated the true costs, thus allowing companies to recover their actual 
investment18. 
Failure to finish RES-E projects is a critical issue in energy systems that have binding RES 
targets. In Brazil, for instance, there has been an intense competition in recent rounds of 
auctions, some of which have ended with winning bids of US$67/MWh, which is a 
significantly lower figure than others seen in comparatively more mature markets, such as 
the U.S. There is a legitimate fear that winning bidders will not be able to deliver at these 
levels. Only time will tell whether these windmills will get installed, but, in any case, the 
harm from potential delays or lack of development is significantly lower, since Brazil (or 
Peru, where also auctions were implemented) must not meet any targets by a given date, 
contrary to the case of EU member states, which have 2020 targets. To counter this risk, 
auction winners are required to produce financial warranties, which offer an additional 
mechanism for enforcement. Overall, auctions can be extremely advantageous but require 
careful and flexible regulatory and rule design in each power system. 
Currently, auctions appear to be the unavoidable heirs to successful FIT programs. That is, 
if too many parties are interested in participating in the RES-E market and benefitting from 
FIT, governments and regulators soon find themselves with the difficult task of having to 
allocate limited supports to a large pool of interested parties; there is thus no other option 
but to switch to auctions. For example, in Spain, current FIT for wind have resulted in more 
than 40,000 MW applications to the System Operator of interested capacity when the 
government target is only 2,000 MW per year. 
4 CONCLUSIONS 
This paper provides a comprehensive review of direct RES-E support mechanisms, ranging 
from price-based (FIT, FIP, and tax incentives) to quantity-based schemes (RPS and 
tenders). We discuss the different components that these designs may include, highlighting 
the advantages and disadvantages of each one. While most studies of the regulatory design 
of RES-E support mechanism focus on assessing the effectiveness and efficiency of the 
different alternatives, our discussion pays special attention to a research area that has not 
received enough attention in the literature: how the different RES-E support schemes 
impact the performance of the energy market, how they define the interaction between this 
market and the RES-E sector, and the overall effects on the ownership structure of the RES-
E sector. 
RES-E, and particularly wind and solar power, have only recently reached significant levels 
of penetration in some countries, but they are expected to grow considerably in the next few 
decades. In some electric power systems (e.g. Denmark, Germany, Spain, and Texas), RES-E 
technologies currently have an important influence on the performance of the energy market 
by significantly affecting price dynamics, regulatory requirements, the need to balance 
reserves and manage network congestions, etc. Moreover, RES-E in these systems have a 
strong impact on electricity tariffs. Therefore, regulatory analyses need to widen their scope 
to carefully assess how the different support mechanisms affect the energy market 
performance in the short- (i.e. operations) and in the long-run (expansion), as well as on how 
                                                 
18 The tendering mechanism was replaced by a feed-in tariff in 2009, according to which four different prices 
have been set according to the wind availability of the different regions.  
Working Paper CEEPR 
14  
to review current energy market rules in order to optimize performance in both time 
horizons. 
We argue that, when remuneration of RES-E installations is tied to short-term energy 
market prices, RES-E receive market signals that may lead to more efficient operations, but, 
conversely, this approach also creates incentives for incumbent generators to increase their 
market power by assembling a generation portfolio that includes both RES-E infra-marginal 
capacity and conventional units.  
This dual effect calls for a careful redesign of current RES-E mechanisms. Our 
recommendation is to distinguish between two different types of RES-E, dispatchable, such 
as biomass, small hydro, geothermal, etc., and non-dispatchable, such as wind and solar. In 
the case of non-dispatchable RES-E, linking remuneration to spot prices (from the day-
ahead energy market, typically) does not result in any clear efficiency improvements, since 
these generators have almost no means to adapt their output to the price signals. 
Additionally, as our discussion shows, linking remuneration to market prices has some 
negative impacts on the level of competition in both the electricity market and the RES-E 
investment market. However, there is no doubt that exposing RES-E installations –for both 
dispatchable and non-dispatchable technologies– to the cost of imbalances in the shorter 
term (i.e. after the day-ahead market) enhances their ability to properly estimate their 
production, minimizing the cost of reserves for the whole system19. Thus, the more suitable 
alternative would be to set a fixed remuneration per MWh produced from non-dispatchable 
RES-E, regardless of the value of spot prices. However, to encourage the improvement of 
the forecast of the output of these non-dispatchable plants, generators should be exposed to 
the balancing markets and be responsible (partly, at least) for the costs incurred by 
deviations from their declared schedule. 
The second major conclusion, as it has also been discussed in IEA (2008) or Newbery et al. 
(2011), is that the adequate RES-E support mechanism for a given power system depends on 
the sectoral maturity of the RES-E industry. In other words, some regulatory options are 
more appropriate for less mature technologies, while others are ideal for more proven ones. 
The experiences discussed above suggest that, as RES-E technologies and industries 
improve over time and competition grows, regulators can follow some kind of evolution in 
the support mechanisms and gradually and with certainty substitute the existing schemes 
according to the most recent information, also taking into account the need for regulatory 
stability.  
Our recommendation is to gradually move from price-based mechanisms (FIT and FIP), 
which are best suited to less mature RES-E technologies, to auctions, which can 
accommodate players in more developed RES-E markets. In particular, for non-dispatchable 
RES-E, such as wind and solar, regulators should use FIT, but including also incentives to 
minimize imbalances, as mentioned above. For dispatchable RES-E, FIT can be used during 
the very early stages of deployment, and then they can then be replaced by FIP. Once the 
market gains sufficient expertise and a healthy level of competition among RES-E 
generators, regulators should progressively move from FIT and/or FIP to auctions. 
Contracts awarded in auctions should respect the differentiation between dispatchable and 
non-dispatchable RES-E regarding spot price-based remuneration. In all events, in order to 
                                                 
19 Recent developments in wind generators, for instance, allow them to adjust their output to a certain point 
adjusting the pitch of their blades, therefore providing high quality operating reserves (NERC, 2009). 
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mitigate the potential regulatory risks, RES-E installations should make use of long-term 
contracts that could include the System Operator as counter-party. 
Finally, we close with an important remark: regardless of the preferred regulatory design, 
RES supports have broad and multiple effects in the complete energy model and thus require 
an equally comprehensive and efficient approach to cost-sharing. Currently, countries and 
regions around the world are experiencing a growing need for renewables, not only for the 
power and transport industries but also for the entire economy, mostly due to climate 
change commitments. This need, coupled with governments’ perennial concerns about 
political sensitivity to increasing energy and fuel rates, especially for electric power, has 
highlighted the importance of energy tariff design as a critical component of RES and 
energy system regulation. In Denmark, in 2010, the taxes imposed on the electricity price in 
order to finance subsidies to renewables and energy research represented 9% of the total 
price of electricity (DERA, 2011). As of January 2011, electricity consumers will have to pay 
a EEG reallocation charge (EEG Umlage) of 3.53 Cent/kWh (Lang & Mutschler, 2010). In 
2010, Spain’s support expenditures for RES technologies reached €5300 million, 21% of the 
total electricity bill (Samaniego, 2011). The Finish government has announced the new FIT 
will be funded directly from the national budget. 
The better the methodology for allocating these costs, the smaller is the risk of public 
dissatisfaction and hence the larger the amount of total RES that can be deployed. As it is 
proposed and justified in Batlle (2011), given that RES targets affect all types of energy 
supplies, RES-E subsidy costs should not be allocated just among electricity consumers, but 
across final energy consumers in direct proportion to their energy consumption and 
regardless of the type of final energy consumed (liquid fuels, gas, electricity, coal, etc.).  
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